9 ideas
| 21513 | We can no more expect a precise definition of coherence than we can of the moral ideal [Ewing] |
| 21497 | If undetailed, 'coherence' is just a vague words that covers all possible arguments [Ewing] |
| 23111 | If we say that freedom depends on rationality, the irrational actions are not free [Sidgwick] |
| 2599 | Either intentionality causes things, or epiphenomenalism is true [Fodor] |
| 2597 | Contrary to the 'anomalous monist' view, there may well be intentional causal laws [Fodor] |
| 2598 | Lots of physical properties are multiply realisable, so why shouldn't beliefs be? [Fodor] |
| 23059 | Self-interest is not rational, if the self is just a succession of memories and behaviour [Sidgwick, by Gray] |
| 4129 | It is self-evident (from the point of view of the Universe) that no individual has more importance than another [Sidgwick] |
| 20588 | Sidwick argues for utilitarian institutions, rather than actions [Sidgwick, by Tuckness/Wolf] |